Enterprises have been increasingly adopting server virtualization technologies in recent years. Security risk identification and related controls have also been receiving increased discussion lately. i Also, guidance is available on virtualization security configurations from independent groups, such as benchmarks from the Center for Internet Security ii and the virtualization vendors. iii This writing will revisit the risks and controls, which will be a basis for discussion of assessment techniques. As security assessors, auditors and compliance validators see more of the physical environment disappearing and being replaced by the virtual foundation, gathering the necessary metrics from virtual environment will be a key part of assurance activities.
eventually flaws will be discovered. While some instances of inappropriate access of one virtual machine (i.e., VMs or guests) to another VM, or to the host, have been cited in nonenterprise products iv , there have yet to be a similar confidentiality breech confirmed for the ESX product.
A fourth risk category, outside of the virtualization tools discussed here, is related to the infrastructure within which the virtualization tools reside. For example, if the processor in the ESX host is susceptible to the "Blue Pill" vulnerability, the ESX host's confidentiality or availability may be adversely affected through no fault of its own. The compensating controls for this risk may be best accomplished with physical access controls whose assessment procedures and tools are well documented. v
Risks Transferred from the Physical World
The virtualization tools that allocate host computing resources such as processors, memory, storage, and networking reside on a host with an operating system or console operating system (COS) that assists with the management and administration of those allocations. Any weakness in the COS could result in confidentiality or availability attacks that could negatively impact the virtualization tools, thus potentially providing an attack vector to harm the VMs.
Configuration standards for the COS based on the sources cited above and adjusted for the particular organization's security risk appetite need to be developed first to establish build procedures, monitoring procedures, and a baseline to which any assessment metrics can be compared. Included in these configuration standards are topics such as secure root access, network port limitations, running services limitations, and many others found in a typical operating system hardening or configuration guide.
Powerful administration access to the COS, particularly the remote variations, including management software, client software, and browser-based and traditional (such as SSH) remote access tools, should be appropriately configured with strong authentication and encryption where appropriate. Virtualization tools, like many other software products, include built-in logical access controls to control access to the features of their software. These default roles, ranging from readonly to all-powerful, should be assigned to users based on the least privilege principle, and any new roles created should be traceable to approved business needs and the organization's change control documentation.
Risks Exacerbated by Virtualization
Most of the issues around security and compliance transfer from the physical world to the virtual world as described above, but the complexity of virtual environments, as well as the ease and speed in which a new virtual machine can be created, have increased the impact and likelihood of unfavorable events. Examples include unassociated (rogue) VMs or guest machines, inappropriate network segmentation, and other risks.
Unassociated (Rogue) Guests
We asked for deployment speed and we got it. A VM can be quickly created, cloned, or derived from a template. If this ease of creation and duplication is not subject to the same asset inventory management that the physical server world was accustomed to, quickly there can be a growth in the number of VMs. While the well-meaning administrator may be seeking to achieve objectives such as research or recovery, "extra" copies of VM can possibly sit dormant, not receiving the operating system or application patches needed to keep the VM secure. This creates vulnerability should these VMs, which are not up to the security standard, be re-introduced into the production environment.
Network Segmentation
In virtual environments, ESX servers may have three different traffic patterns external to the virtualization tool, including production, management, and storage (i.e., iSCSI). Each of these traffic patterns should be on a different network, and the management and storage segments should have a limited number of people who can access them. Network segmentation external to the ESX host will facilitate recovery if, for example, the production network is iv http://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search. do?language=en_US&cmd=displayKC&externalId= 1004034 for VM to Host access vulnerability v http://www.isaca.org/ContentManagement/Content Display.cfm?ContentID=43024 down and the management network is functioning properly, then the management network can be used to access the host and help restore the production network. Segmentation also enhances confidentiality as some activities transfer data in the clear or do not have native robust access control.
Internal virtual network segmentation within a host and between its various VMs is also possible with the virtualization tools, but this flexibility runs the risk that internal virtual segments cannot be reached from the external network. This could hamper traditional ingress security techniques, such as antivirus updates or operating system updates, or egress security techniques such as monitoring/alerting or log consolidation.
Other
VMs can be cloned with a complete collection of applications installed on top of an operating system. When the duplicate (or more) VM(s) are created, the organization needs to ensure their licensing agreement with the vendors covers that type of instance.
Staff skills must grow to meet the complexity of the more centralized resource allocation duties placed on the administrator of the virtualization tools. Physical server team members, while competent in networking concepts, are usually placed in a role where they may create multiple virtual switches, VLANs, and maybe deploy a VM with router capabilities. The server team members need a combination of increased training and increased communication with the physical network team as well as the information security team.
Backup and recovery strategies must be revisited to include the additional components virtualization tools introduce such as the host, management console, and configuration database. The virtualization environment does enable more methods to backup (maybe re-provision is a better term) VMs, which is good news from a continuity standpoint but beyond the scope of this article. vi CONTROLS While a multitude of control techniques transfer from the physical server world, three themes below become critical when virtualization tools are in use, including:
• Asset management -an accurate inventory of hosts and VMs, and a process to keep that inventory current (such as integration with the change management process). • Change management -given the speed and ease with which a VM can be deployed, it is essential that the disciplines of authorization, testing, scheduling, rollback, communication, and monitoring extend to hosts and VMs. • Configuration management -a standards-based organization specific configuration guide for hosts (and the virtual components they manage, such as virtual switches) and VMs provides the foundation for monitoring activities to be successful.
Assessment Techniques
The goals of monitoring and assessment are similar; however, the timing differs, monitoring being a continuous process and assessment more ad-hoc. The processes of monitoring and assessment are also similar: gather the current state of an item in scope and compare that state to the organization's standard. Gathering metrics on the current state of a virtualized environment is similar to the process used for physical servers, there are both nontechnical and technical techniques.
Configuration
There are many techniques to gather current state metrics to assess the risk of nonstandard configuration of ESX hosts, much like in the physical world. Some are free or self developed and some are commercially available.
Assuming the organization has developed a host build standard or policy, some tools to gather metrics (e.g., covering logical access to the COS) may be free. The command line interface (CLI) is available at the console of the ESX server to issue COS commands that display the contents of configuration files (cat / etc/login.defs). This command and other similar enumeration output can be combined in bash scripts and run on selected hosts. The management console (Virtual Center [VC] for an ESX host), if already purchased for system administration purposes, can serve as a marginally cost-free tool to gather similar metrics from the host. Management consoles generally report on metrics they have been made aware of vi http://www.vmware.com/pdf/vi3_301_201_vm_ backup.pdf and are stored in their configuration database, which may not be all items available to a host (see rogue VM discussion below).
Other free tools are available and come in partial and full forms. Under partial configuration checking tools, the free offerings from Tripwire (configcheck) vii and Configuresoft (ComplianceChecker) viii are designed to give the user a sampling of how the tools work. While not a complete gathering of metrics in either the scope of tests performed or limited in the retention of results, any variances found by these two tools with the benchmarks above certainly should be considered for remediation. The commercial tools above in their full form provide a comprehensive review of the host configuration and scale across the enterprise.
Since the ESX COS is a Linux derivative, many of the security-related settings and services that make sense to assess in a Linux host also make sense to assess on an ESX host. Vendors, correctly so, point out that there are many custom features of the COS that make it different from the Linux operating system. While this is true, there are many characteristics of the COS that are equal to Linux and can be assessed by free tools such as Bastille ix in the assessment mode and the Center for Internet Security Computer Assessment Tool (CIS CAT) x . Both tools gather metrics from an ESX COS using a Red Hat Enterprise Linux rules database. Experience has shown that many of the tests results are accurate and can be validated with command line results; for example, the command line results of enumerating the /etc/login.defs file above will corroborate both of these tools assessment of 99999 days for password expiration on a default ESX COS installation.
One free tool to use with caution is Linux Security and Audit Tool (LSAT) xi , which in the current version 0.9.7.1 performs many excellent tests of the COS but also performs an MD5 sum of files for change monitoring purposes. This MD5sum is performed on the files in the /vmfs/ directory, which include very large *.vmdk files containing the VM which takes a significant amount of time on these gigabyte-sized files. It is best if this tool is used in a preproduction lab environment with the VMs turned off.
Change Management
The nontechnical metric gathering techniques work best for assessing processes influenced by human judgment. Adherence to change management procedures may be best assessed by tracing additions to the asset inventory to appropriate approval, testing, scheduling, and other documentation.
The nontechnical assessment process above will rely on the validity of the asset inventory data. The integrity of that data may be validated using technical means below as discussed below in rogue guests. Technical assessment methods may be obtained or developed at no cost, or they may be commercial products. Technical assessment methods may scale well to many hosts and many VMs, and some may not.
Network Segmentation
Many times security professionals and server professionals are after the same goals, that is, highly reliable systems. Therefore, some of the same metrics an assessor is interested in are also items system administrators wish to monitor. Tools used for administration such as VC provide graphic display of virtual networks with related VMs, plus any associated physical Network Interface Cards (NICs). This image can be quickly used to analyze segregation of management and production traffic on a host. This visual technique can be quickly applied to as many hosts as are managed by VC.
Detailed enumeration of virtual switch configurations can also be performed at the COS command line. In addition to traditional Linux enumeration techniques discussed above in configuration assessment techniques, special vendor specific commands may be executed in the COS and their output used to corroborate the graphical display of the network data shown in VC. A collection of esxcfg-xxxx commands achieve this goal, with the esxcfg-vswitch -l command specifically describing the virtual switches and portgroups plus physical nics associated with each virtual switch. 
Unassociated (Rogue) VMs
Answering the question of asset inventory integrity addresses one of the key risks of unassociated (rogue) VMs. We will use this example to explore some of the more technical tools available for assessing a virtual environment. This is assessment includes two questions: 1) Are there any items on the inventory list that actually do not exist? 2) Are there any assets (VMs or hosts) that exist but are not captured in the inventory? The first question may represent somewhat lower risk if the inventory is used to drive other activities, such as backups, when those activities commence on an asset that is not present those activities should note the error for appropriate review. The second question poses a higher risk, since the unrecorded VM or host may miss backups, patches, or other important security or operational processes.
For definition, an unassociated VM may result when a copy of a VM is made, and maybe for nonnefarious reasons, then is disassociated from the host it was originally assigned. Sometimes the disassociation can occur without the deletion of the underlying files (.vmx, .vmdk) that comprise the VM. Those components lie in wait for a few clicks of the mouse to provide reactivation. It is important to identify those unassociated vmx/vmdk file combination and assess their readiness for redeployment into production.
Finding something that is not recorded is difficult. Generally, commercial tools and the vendor supplied management console do an excellent job of keeping track of items of which they are informed but are less adept at discovery. Some commercial tools are capable of discovering hosts but not guests; this may be the result of their analysis being driven by the virtualization tools database rather than raw discovery.
Vendor management consoles such as VC can be used to identify these unassociated vmx/vmdk combinations by visually comparing the content of the data stores to the inventory of VMs associated with a host, which is a time-consuming manual process.
This process can be automated. A recently released tool, VMware Infrastructure Toolkit for Windows xii , provides custom commandlets for use with Windows Powershell xiii . These VMware commandlets along with Microsoft commandlets afford the unique combination of drawing data from the host and drawing data from the VC database. These two data collections of actual vmx/vmdk files and associated VMs can then be joined xiv and differences identified.
Commercial tools xv may also assist in identifying changes to the VM inventory. Some tools are configuration management oriented and may help validate inventory using the agents that are deployed on the VMs, or comparing a current inventory against a prior inventory and noting changes. Some tools designed to secure and protect the VMs may also provide useful data. Reflex xvi provides a discovery function that allows identification of hosts. This identification can be used to corroborate the VC inventory by an assessor should the organization already have this software in place.
Also, note that all tools do not perform equally well in each assessment topical area. CIS-CAT, a useful tool for configuration assessment of the COS, is little help in finding rogue VMs. The assessment approach will likely utilize a combination of tools to get a complete picture of the virtualization environment. 1 1 1 = test in your lab against your assessment requirements relevant to your organization's infrastructure and security policy, some of these tools are designed to alter the configuration of hosts/VMs discovered as non-compliant, assessors should ensure they only utilize these tools in a passive mode
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